It has been over a year since the Gaza War was prompted into existence by the Oct 7 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. During which Hamas’ militants in Gaza launched thousands of rockets towards Israel. At the same time gunmen from Gaza infiltrated southern Israeli communities, killing over 1000 people and taking both Israeli soldier and civilian hostages. Hamas claimed at the time that it had captured 53 “prisoners of war”. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel was “at war” and vowed that Hamas would “pay an unprecedented price”. Waves of air strikes on Gaza followed, increasing the casualty list substantially. These trends continue to date with the death toll making its way towards 50,000.
This war has caused much debate in the jihadist community and has in turn, been significant in highlighting frictions within al-Qaeda. But who is Hamas? How did their actions cause disarray in one of the most well-known militant groups in the east and most importantly what potential issues could this disarray cause to the future of al-Qaeda and the other Islamist militant groups? To answer these questions, we must first delve into the history of Hamas and see why it has been a source of controversy in the world of Sunni-Jihadism.
Hamas:
Hamas or Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyah, is a Sunni-Islamist militant group that violently rejects the existence of Israel, which it claims is occupying Palestine. Its goal is to end the Jewish state and create an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Second to this, they intend to facilitate the “liberation of Palestine” and the “return” of the Palestinian people. On the face of it, the group’s overarching aims are aligned with those of al-Qaeda, as is the violent nature of its attacks and its portrayal of Israel as an anti-Islamic, Jewish-Christian “crusader” puppet of the western allies. These aims however differ because Hamas is focussed on the local issues rather than the larger goal of creating a global Islamic caliphate and the methods, they used in their attempts to achieve local success, are contradictory to al-Qaeda’s beliefs.
There are four main aspects to Hamas’ history that collide with the Sunni-jihadist belief system, causing it to be shunned by many. Firstly, Hamas is widely considered part of Iran’s “axis of resistance”, largely a collection of Iranian-sponsored Shi’ite actors, many of which al-Qaeda, as a Sunni-Muslin, Salafi-Jihadi actor has directly and indirectly clashed with in the Syrian Civil War.
Secondly al-Qaeda condemns democracy as a Western and un-Islamic concept. Hamas’ embrace of the “polytheistic” religion of democracy by participation in and winning the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, was sharply opposed and viewed as a step towards accepting the existing nation-state order and indirectly legitimizing Israel’s existence. The outcome of the election led to Hamas operating as the de facto leader of the Gaza Strip.
The last two issues occurred after the election. Hamas was criticized for its failure to implement “appropriate” Sharia-based legislation, supposedly failing to rule by Islamic law and it was involved in the repression of Salafi-jihadi factions in Gaza. Some known for their supportive stance towards al-Qaeda, such as Jaysh al Ummah. Despite all of this al-Qaeda has staked out a position of nearly unlimited support and sympathy for Hamas since “Operation al-Aqsa Flood” started. But why did they choose this method? To understand that we will look at the statements given by al-Qaeda and their intended impacts, in more detail.
The Dilemma:
Although al-Qaeda had made their views on Hamas very obvious in their previous statements, going as far as announcing that Hamas had “lost its religion”. They are aware that historically, wars have been great motivators for inspiring extremist to take up arms or provide financial support and that Hamas had been acting as the vanguard of violent Islamism in a conflict that bears enormous significance for Muslims around the world. Hence it would be illogical for them not to capitalise on the countries suffering.
The question is how did they utilize the situation, given that they have no direct links into the battle ground and they are not on good terms with Hamas? It became apparent to them that the best way to benefit, was to use the widely publicized devastation to convert people to extremisms and gain more followers. But even this is a tricky thing to do given that their relationship with Hamas is also publicly available and supporting Hamas after denouncing them would be contradictory. So how did al-Qaeda go from statements such as “the Hamas leader has sold out Palestine” and “they betrayed the dreams of their young fighters” to “an exquisite political and military painting by the mujahideen” when describing the attack that began the war?
Well, their methods were simple and mimicked by their affiliates. In their statements they either, differentiated between the political and military factions of Hamas or they avoided mentioning the group directly, instead opting to reference their “brothers in Palestine” or similar descriptions. The first tactic follows an announcement they previously made in 2009 condemning the political faction as being “deeply flawed” whilst giving al-Qassam brigades (Hamas’ military faction) a clean slate to work from.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates avoided drawing attention to the issues that contradicted the Sunni-jihadis belief system and instead highlighted the aspects that aligned, drawing a blind eye to the problems. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) did mentioned Hamas’ connection to the “Iranian axis of evil”, however it was portrayed as a necessity that could only be prevented if alternative funding was made available to them from the Muslim community.
As unsettling as many members of al-Qaeda would have found these methods, they gave al-Qaeda and their affiliates the flexibility to freely draw parallels between Gaza and the areas where al-Qaeda’s affiliates are actively operational, without directly undermining themselves. Al-Qaeda elaborated on how they are all fighting the same enemy and that Muslims everywhere should attack any Jews and Western targets they can get to. Al-Shabaab in particular did this well, going as far as recreating images of militants in Gaza, with their own members to highlight the similarities. Also, by showing their leniency towards Hamas, al-Qaeda was able to present the image of a more “moderate” alternative to Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that may appeal to the wider community.
Al-Qaeda clearly sees the liberation of Palestine and the fight against Israel as a strategic opportunity to unite the world’s Muslims in a global struggle and is willing to indirectly contradict its self in order to use the war for its own gain. The problem with this stance is that some of the key jihadi ideologists who have long supported al-Qaeda and who command a certain following within al-Qaeda’s global network, are deeply uncomfortable with it. These individuals believe that al-Qaeda’s stance represents their ongoing ideological evolution towards a more generic kind of Islamism and therefore is not in line with the ideology of the jihadi movement.
The Moral Conflict:
The most noteworthy of these individuals is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian-Jordanian scholar whose writings have profoundly shaped the ideology of the jihadi movement “the jihadi current (al-tayyar al-jihadi)”. His influence in the jihadist community stretches across the world and his writings and teachings on Salafi Islam have inspired terrorist from Europe to the middle east, including Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s Successor as the head of al-Qaeda Central.
The ideological authority al-Maqdisi was afforded within al-Qaeda previously is evidenced in the 2009 interview where al-Qaeda’s commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid stated “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same manhaj”. Al-Maqdisi’s response to this statement was a 20-page rebuttal setting out all the ways in which Hamas did not adhere to “the manhaj of the Jihadi Salafi current”, leading to Abu al-Yazid issuing a correction clarifying that al-Qaeda distinguishes between the political wing of Hamas, which is “deeply flawed” and Hamas’s military wing, which merits support as mujahidin fighting a shared enemy.
However, in recent years this authority has changed, with al-Maqdisi finding himself critiquing what he sees as al-Qaeda’s ideological drift and al-Qaeda only drifting further. In 2021 al-Maqdisi rebuked al-Qaeda’s official media agency, al-Sahab for a statement mourning the death of a Hamas senior military commander. He even went as far as accusing al-Qaeda of turning its back on the jihadi manhaj. “Has the manhaja changed?! Have the ranks of al-Qaeda been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj?”
Despite al-Maqdisi’s writing being restricted by the Jordanian authorities, what has been seen of al-Maqdisi’s messages since Oct 2023, has included severe criticism, articulating the moral confusion al-Qaeda has caused their followers and denouncing al-Qaeda’s relevance to the Israeli/Gaza war. His writings indicate that his concerns are only growing, as al-Qaeda continues to praise and support Hamas despite his numerous objections. “A great many shaykhs and groups have ridden the wave of this flood such that they have nearly drowned their followers in the misconception of innovative groups and ensnared them in contradiction”, “you are simply not part of its (Hamas’) direction”, “you haven’t the least participation or say in its vital decisions”.
Al-Maqdisi was not the only person to condemn al-Qaeda’s behaviour. On 22 April 2024, the Canadian-based Egyptian jihadi ideologue, Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim, reacted negatively to al-Qaeda offering condolences for the death of the family members of Ismail Haniyeh (the head of Hamas political bureau in Qatar). Tariq expressed the view that al-Qaeda had departed from their previous stance of distinguishing between Hamas’s political and military wings. Emphasizing that al-Qaeda saluted Hamas’s political leader as “the honourable shaykh”, twice in their statement.
Tariq expanded on this by re-publishing al-Maqdisi’s essay “The Spittle of the Stricken One” and adding commentary of his own. “There is no doubt that al-Qaeda following the martyrdom of its two pioneers (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri) has passed into a state of manifest instability, confusion, and waywardness, as is perhaps apparent in its recent statement concerning the family members of Ismail Haniyeh”
In Aug, Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Makki, a top cleric in al-Qaeda’s branch Hurras al-Din, expressed his disapproval of the mourning of Ismail Haniyeh, describing Hamas as a “deviant” group and warning against leniency with those who follow an “errant path”.
It is clear that there are multiple opinions on the correct course of action, when it comes to the Gaza War within al-Qaeda and it is not the first time that varying beliefs have impacted the unity of its members. Arguably the most significant split in al-Qaeda’s history, was also caused by differing beliefs and it actually led to the creation of the group known as ISIS. Al-Qaeda’s main competitor for the prominence in the jihadist community.
ISIS:
ISIS is a Sunni-Muslin Jihadist organisation who claims to be the legitimate ruler of all Sunni Muslims worldwide. Its goal is to consolidate and broaden its territory in Syria and Iraq, expanding into neighbouring Sunni countries to build a manageable and defensible Islamic state. It originated in Jordan, initially called “Organization of Monotheism and Jihad” and it moved to Iraq when the US invasion of Iraq began in 2003.
In 2004 ISIS became al-Qaeda’s first international affiliate under the new name al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which boosted its credibility and gave it access to al-Qaeda’s resources. However, their ideological beliefs never quite aligned, causing strain on their alliance. All attempts to reconcile the differences between the two groups ultimately failed because ISIS’ belief that the caliphate should not negotiate with other Muslims who are in fact obligated to support the caliphate instead of questioning it and in 2014, they finally went their separate ways.
Al-Qaeda spent years as the sole group capable of acting out the movement’s transnational goals, with other groups pledging their allegiance. That only changed because ISIS was able to expand in strength and skill, eventually becoming strong enough to challenge al-Qaeda. Creating, for the first time, a situation where the wider movement was split between two competing factions.
Their fight has primarily centred around leadership and legitimacy, turning narrative control into a large part of their competition. Each group repeatedly portrays the other in a negative way impacting both their appeal. Al-Qaeda portrays ISIS as disloyal, having broken its pledge of bayah, and as having unsound methodology, due to their unwarranted violence towards the Shia Muslims population. It also conveys its belief that ISIS’ efforts to establish a caliphate were rushed.
On the other side, ISIS portrays al-Qaeda as having failed in their position as the movement’s leadership and highlights al-Qaeda’s delay to declare a califates, as a sign of weakness. It also presents the attempts to divide Syria and Iraq between ISIS and al Nusra (aligned to al-Qaeda between April 2013 and July 2016) as a betrayal of core jihadist beliefs, due to the countries being separated by the 1916 sykes-picot agreement, a treaty between Western powers.
A recent example of one such interaction occurred Sep 2024, when a pro-IS media group spammed a prominent pro-al-Qaeda RocketChat with hundreds of pro-IS messages that lead to a partial suspension of operations. Clearly undermining al-Qaeda’s authority and its ability to utilize the platform.
Conclusion:
One of the strengths of an extremist ideology is that it presents the world as black and white, which makes the narrative that it tries to sell easier to transmit. When the ideology becomes fractured and its leaders argue amongst themselves, it loses its ability to maintain the simple narrative of good and evil that it promotes, which also negatively impacts its appeal. This has happened repeatedly not just between ISIS and al-Qaeda, but between the current members and supporters of al-Qaeda, as highlighted earlier with the examples regarding al-Maqdisi, Tariq and al-Makki.
What is to stop the newest divide of beliefs from causing further splits in al-Qaeda, potentially leading to the rise of more groups and in turn more competition? Each group competing for the same resources, degrading each other’s credibility, potentially fighting directly over the same territories and utilizing what little resources that they have in their battle for superiority, instead of focussing on their goals.
The latest religious divide’s potential for damaging, not only al-Qaeda but all competing Jihadist groups, is unmistakable. The one thing we do know is that the ideology of a group is supposed to unify the individuals involved and give them a clear path in which to follow, but it has clearly not done so here.