Nine days later Islamic State (IS) finally commented on the 1 January attack in New Orleans, USA, which claimed 14 lives, and suggested the action was inspired by IS messaging and incitement, rather than being directly orchestrated by the group. Notably, IS did not indicate any connection between itself and the perpetrator, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, who was shot dead.
This IS observation was featured in group’s weekly newspaper al-Naba (issue 477), which was published on 9 January through IS channels on Telegram and other social media platforms.
IS claimed that its inbox is “always brimming with messages linked to attacks from around the world”. The group emphasized that though it is prepared to support such actions, it would not automatically claim association unless an attack met certain unspecified criteria stating “The Islamic State is not desperate to claim any attack around the world, as some may think, even if such attacks stem from its ideology or were the fruit of its incitement, or even more”
Despite the New Orleans attack being presented as a propaganda coup and “evidence” of IS’s “enduring influence”, the al-Naba article did not openly praise Jabbar, who was shot dead by police, or title him as a “martyr”. The editorial simply denoted him as “an American man influenced by Islamic State messaging and propaganda”. He was described using generic terms such as “a man in his 40s”and “the attacker”. IS have historically been effusive in their praise of attacker referring to them as “lions” and “martyrs”, but Jabbar was not given such acclaim.
Why did the claim take so long?
There are multiple potential reasons behind the claim. It is probable that Jabbar’s profile was a factor in IS’s reluctance to comment on the New Orleans attack and its ultimate decision to refrain from claiming a direct link. There were multiple factors to suggest that the group would claim responsibility, including public statements from US authorities indicating evidence of Jabbar’s support of IS, and the reported presence of an IS flag in the vehicle used in the attack, however this was not the case.
More importantly Jabbar served in the US army on active duty from 2006 to 2015 and then in the army reserve from 2015 to 2020. He had deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 and was a staff sergeant when he was honourably discharged in 2020. It is likely that such extensive US military service, including his deployment to Afghanistan would have been met with criticism from some elements within IS supporters.
It remains unclear whether IS received a pledge ahead of the attack, which may have caused confusion. This is believed to be unlikely as any pledge would have held significant propaganda value for the group.
Despite a relatively detached tone towards Jabbar, the al-Naba editorial defended him against “anti-jihad voices” and “hypocrites”. IS accused these voices of attempting to “cast doubt about the Jabbar’s motives”, claiming that “they even questioned his Islam and dismissed his repentance” – presumably partly for his military service – “and sought to use his past to shame him.”
Are IS becoming more selective about claiming responsibility or is IS media simply unable to respond at the same pace previously seen?
There is a precedence for IS to not claim attacks where there was seemingly evidence to suggest IS inspiration or allegiance. In 2024 incidents in Zurich and Belgrade where the perpetrators posted videos online claiming to support IS, group did not receive an official IS claim. IS belatedly recognized the incidents in an al-Naba editorial, taking credit for inspiring the actions, but as seen with the New Orleans attack did not claim direct involvement in directing or assisting the perpetrators.
IS has previously claimed in an editorial in al-Naba that regardless of whether an individual publicly or privately expresses support for the group, if they carry out an attack aligned with its instructions or influenced by its ideology, they become “one of us, and we are one of them”, without the need for a claim. In august 2024 IS stated that it was no longer necessary for the group to claim “each and every attack” carried out in its name or inspired by its ideology. It argued that, by now, everyone recognises whether an attack “carries the hallmarks” of IS.
In the past, similar attacks were often followed by brief IS claims, mostly through its Amaq “news agency”, declaring that perpetrators were “soldiers” of the group whose actions were carried out in response to IS calls for violence.
Infighting amongst IS supporters
Whilst it could be claimed that IS has simply changed the criteria required to claim an attack some sources suggest that this is indicative of the pressure that the IS media machine is facing. Due to the ongoing pressure the group faces in Iraq and Syria it has simply lost too many of its cadre of skilled (and more importantly trusted) media operatives to be able to respond to events as quickly as it could at the height of the Caliphate. The group’s propaganda operation is nowhere near as prolific as it was in IS’s heyday. IS official messaging output is still dominated by routine attack claims and even its weekly newspaper al-Naba is becoming increasingly basic and repetitive. The slick, well-produced videos the group used to be renowned for are now increasingly rare.
Throughout 2024, the pro-IS online media environment was characterised by two key developments: a sustained crackdown on jihadist accounts on the messaging app Telegram, and, more interestingly, signs of internal conflict among the group’s supporters online. Throughout 2024, both pro and anti-IS voices spoke of divisions among IS’s supportive online media, with heated disagreements and allegations playing out on social media platforms.
Although recent disharmony among IS media supporters has been multi-faceted, the most intense disputes have revolved around the influential pro-IS online aggregator and disseminator Intaj al-Ansar. Intaj al-Ansar is a pro-IS media outlet whose task is to share the output of various pro-IS media groups to boost their visibility and reach. There have been allegations about the poor management and “dubious” links and agenda of the outlet’s supposed administrator Abu Qutaida, along with criticism of Intaj al-Ansar’s output.
The lack of direct messaging and guidance from IS’s official media has not helped matters. One source of division has been the suspicion among some IS supporters that other individuals and groups have tried to claim official status or endorsement from or IS’s central media office.
The ongoing lack of eye-catching official IS propaganda and timely influencing of the narrative has possibly left a messaging vacuum when compared to recent years, which has exacerbated supporter rivalries. One example is the frustration at the lack of official visual content, which has led to debates and disagreements over supporter-led innovations to boost IS messaging, such as AI products. Moreover, there has been little IS guidance or intervention in its this infighting, with some claims that it is too weak to do so. A call for supporters to remain obedient and united in March 2024, and a subsequent warning against online glory seeking, suggested that the group is aware of and concerned about the problem.
The quality of unofficial media has also come in for criticism. The lack of official IS output has prompted some of the group’s online supporters to discuss innovating content and creating products of their own to promote IS’s message to wider audiences. However, these have often led to heated debate amongst supporters. For instance, it was pointed out above how in May 2024 Intaj al-Ansar came under criticism for the “dangerous decline” in the quality of its output.