During 2024, a number of high-profile global attacks resulted in increased attention towards the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province branch (ISKP), and the associated al-Azaim media group. However, this has in fact been a relatively unremarkable year for al-Azaim, with a dip in the quality, quantity and diversity of the media group’s output, particularly during the second half of the year. After a comprehensive social media crackdown on jihadist activity from late-March, al-Azaim and other pro-ISKP media groups struggled to distribute their propaganda material. Even after al-Azaim succeeded in re-establishing itself on the Telegram and RocketChat platforms since August, output has been underwhelming. Although the launch of new activity in Turkish, Urdu and Tajik languages suggests expansive aspirations, the group has struggled to sustain fresh output in these languages.
Al-Azaim’s notable output
Al-Azaim activity peaked during the first three months of 2024, following mass-fatality attacks in Iran on 3 January and Russia on 22 March. Western intelligence sources widely attributed these two major attacks to ISKP, however IS’s official claims for these operations avoided specifically attributing them to ISKP. Al-Azaim also issued a statement threatening further attacks on Russia to avenge the detention and “torturing” of Moscow attack suspects. The February elections in Pakistan also resulted in a flurry of anti-democracy propaganda by al-Azaim and other pro-ISKP groups.
Al-Azaim was one of a number of entities which frequently issued posters threatening attacks on sports stadiums and Western capitals in 2024. Some comments from jihadist supporters hinted that such activity was more about playing on security fears and eliciting a reaction from the Western media, than being indicative of serious plots.
A poster by al-Azaim celebrated the 11 December killing of the Taliban’s minister for refugees and returnees, Khalil ur Rahman Haqqani. It reminded readers of other high-profile assassinations of Taliban figures, and warned the Taliban that “worse” was still to come.
Branching out in new languages
2024 saw al-Azaim’s expansion into output in Turkish and Urdu. It also announced the launch of a magazine in Tajik. However, al-Azaim has struggled to maintain momentum in distributing propaganda in these languages. The first issue of its Tajik magazine appeared on 29 March, coinciding with a severe crackdown on Telegram channels distributing al-Azaim content. Although there were reports of a second edition, distribution of its content was severely hampered by this crackdown, and consequently very little new al-Azaim output in Tajik has been observed in circulation since then.
There was also limited out specifically tailored towards a Turkish audience. One example of specifically Turkish content was a poster inciting attacks on a prominent Youtuber.
Al-Azaim announced the start of its Urdu language activity in late June, and four editions have been observed of the group’s Urdu-language magazine, Nada-i-Khurasan. However, output in Persian was halted. The vast majority of output in all these languages are straight translations from al-Azaim’s publications in Pashto and English.
Challenges to distribution
Al-Azaim was greatly impacted by the Telegram clampdown from late March. The pro-IS I’lam website also ceased to become available, which had been a major receptacle for al-Azaim output in multiple languages. Other smaller pro-ISKP media groups, like Mubarizin and al-Hadid, were also affected by this clampdown. Later in the year, content by these media groups started to appear on al-Azaim channels.
Reduction in quality and quantity of content
Although Pashto continues as al-Azaim’s primary medium of communication, output in this language has been relatively limited and generic in recent months. When al-Azaim’s flagship Pashto language magazine Khurasan Ghag began appearing in 2022 it was coming out on a twice-monthly basis. However, for most of 2024 the magazine has only been appearing around once every two months.
Output in the last few editions has been heavily repetitive in nature, with repetitive rhetoric attacking the Taliban, even when ostensibly addressing other themes. In recent months it has become unusual to see Khurasan Ghag and its Urdu-language equivalent addressing issues outside the scope of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Some of the material disseminated via al-Azaim channels which on first glance appeared to be badged as new content, actually turned out to be old material which was being recirculated. This could be indicative that al-Azaim has lost media trained individuals capable of creating new content at speed.
The group’s continued penchant for lengthy products can be seen with a recent 241-page Pashto book denouncing the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and calling for the group’s membership to join ISKP.
The group’s English-language Voice of Khurasan magazine has been more diverse. This broader spectrum of content is likely because this publication is focused on Muslims in the West, South Asia, and elsewhere in the world.
Is al-Azaim ISKP’s official mouthpiece?
Al-Azaim continues to maintain a deliberately ambiguous position regarding whether it officially represents ISKP. Although al-Azaim is still the nearest thing ISKP has to an official mouthpiece, the group has tended to avoid formally defining itself as such.
In June, the English translation of an al-Azaim statement appeared to identify the group as the “official” representative of ISKP. However, a few days later, a new replacement version of this statement failed to use the word “official”. This indicates that al-Azaim and ISKP are not comfortable with branding their relationship as “official”.